“Established a few months ago in Nouakchott (Mauritania), the Center 4s has set itself a goal: to make sure that the Sahel Sahara will remain the actor of its own destiny, and not a concern or an additional source of instability for the international community.”
Today the challenges are enormous. Due to vast areas with little or no administration, the security of the Sahel-Sahara area has never been so fragile and informal economies so conducive to all kinds of illegal activities. Life is harsh in this part of the world, and the chances of success very limited. Therefore, the first security threat is the marginalization of whole segments of the society. Continuous, deeply rooted crises, their entanglement and multiplication are now uncontested. However, in the last months, states, populations and economies were faced with an accumulation of new risks and unprecedented violence. Among them, the following:
• Throughout the Sahel, the drought is cyclical but, this year, it will be particularly severe. It adds to an already complex situation filled with dangers.
• Other main threats include trafficking of all kinds – drug, weapons, cigarettes and people – and their successful convoying especially when it comes to hard drugs.
• Piracy in the Gulf of Benin is closely related to occult networks operating from the ground.
• And the takings of Western hostages for payment of ransoms are also part of this shadow economy.
• The deadly violence of Boko Haram, with more than 1,000 deaths between June 2009 and January 2012 during nearly 160 attacks, is worsening an already perilous situation.
• The aftermath of elections in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Guinea are also being awaited with apprehension.
The Nigerian Front: Boko Haram
Boko Haram or Jema’at Ahlu Sunnah Wal Lidda’wa Jihad, as its leaders prefer to be called, is more on the offensive than ever. Its nature is very complex as are most of the issues in Nigeria. Whether it is an authentic Islamic group or a cover for other activities and ambitions, Boko Haram cannot be ignored anymore according to certain explanations, quite interesting, the « extreme poverty » in the Northern states of the country, as well as inequalities in income distribution between federal regions, could have induced Boko Haram. Indeed, the redistribution of funds between the Northeast federal states (Borno, Yobe and Gombe) and the South-east states (Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta) reveals huge gaps in favor of the south. In between 1999 and 2008, the federal allocation was 1,156 Naira per head for the Northern states against 3,332 Naira for the three Southern states. In addition, the last ones received high compensations awarded to former combatants of the rebel Mende as prices of their return to civilian life. For the current fiscal year, 458 million USD were allocated for activities related to the integration of former combatants of the Mende
This analysis does not explain, however, why Boko Haram is so violent particularly when it perpetuates assassinations against ordinary citizens. This is strangely reminiscent of the way radicals operate in Pakistan, Iraq and Algeria, where they kill their countrymen indiscriminately. Furthermore, this violence shows a certain kinship with the extremists of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). In any event, the creation of Al Qaeda in Nigeria or « AQIN » cannot be excluded; and neither the existence of a criminal trail.
Which peaceful solution should be favored in order to get Nigeria out of the crisis? Brazil, another large country, has also experienced violence during the years of dictatorship but turned into a peaceful democracy with the progress of freedom. The long-term peace will pass through more democracy and a more transparent management of public affairs. Meanwhile, an urgent priority is to provide jobs to the 9.5 million Amajiris or street children, who come from Nigeria as well as other neighboring countries, currently “managed” by Boko Haram..
At the heart of the Sahel: the MLNA
In this already very complex Sahel Sahara context erupted, January 17, 2012, a new Tuareg rebellion. As for the previous revolts in Northern Mali, notably those of 1962-64 and 1991-92, this one can be explained by political frustrations and economic consequences of geographic isolation. But unlike the previous ones, it goes beyond the strictly Tuareg’s framework. Trafficking, particularly cocaine, introduces a strong criminal dimension. Terrorists, already active in the field, lend a hand. « Lost soldiers » of the former Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi, who are well trained, armed and very frustrated, also participate. According to persistent reports in the region, the Tuareg soldiers of Gaddafi have received pledges of political support during the fighting in Libya, in exchange for leaving the Guide to its fate. For its part, the Berber International Movement – “Amazigh” – is reportedly willing to support the MNLA.
How will this new rebellion evolve? We already know the losers. As always in such situations, the main victims are the most vulnerable individuals in the population: women, children and elderly, but also the more moderate politicians. The already sparse infrastructures will also suffer. Mining investments, and with them the promise of economic and social development, will be deferred to a later period. Politically, if the participation of AQIM in the Aguelhok killing of January 24, 2012 is proved, the rebellion will have lots of difficulties regaining credibility. For many observers, AQIM participated in the battle under the command of Ama Ag Ahmada, better known under the name of Abdkrim Targui. It is well known that notorious Mauritanians members of this organization, have lost their lives during the fighting. The same observers confirmed the presence of Iyad ag Aghaly with his group Ansar Eddin. Other « lost soldiers » from Libya were also among them, including Colonel Mohamed ag Najim, formerly from Camp March 2 in Tripoli as well as the Islamic Legion that fought in the Aouzou Strip. He has a reputation of knowing, very well, the routes of the Sahel Sahara..
Some recommendations to end violence
Any conflict ends with a negotiation; so we must act quickly to limit the damage of the present crisis. It is particularly important to minimize the polarization of communities not only in Mali but also throughout the Sahel Sahara. Many intermediaries will offer their good offices to manage the crisis. In the present context, the internationalization of the conflict may worsen the situation, and make it a more serious threat to all States concerned. The National Pact signed in Algiers, in 1992, provides a good framework for the stability of Mali and the region. Where should it be best negotiated? Because of its success in Togo and Ivory Coast, Burkina offers an excellent venue. Mauritania, also, offers a possibility. However, Algeria remains an unavoidable choice because of its many advantages such as experience and proximity. Qatar can provide expertise and so do the region’s international partners, including Switzerland.
With regard to substantive issues, a specific recommendation should address the necessity for the new National Pact to establish a National Reconciliation Commission, similar to those created elsewhere. This is in order to deal with the consequences of serious human rights violations – which any group may have been a victim of. The establishment of such a commission could consolidate peace and reconciliation, as well as serve as a preventive measure.
In its Preamble or in the Appendices, the new National Pact should recommend:
• Stability in Libya, so that this country will no longer feed the insecurity in the region as it did during the last three decades.
• Libya should provide assistance for the resettlement of former soldiers of the legions of Gaddafi who are back in their home countries – Mali, Niger and Chad.
• Libya should also agree to discuss the terms and conditions of the return to Libya of some of the former soldiers on the basis of humanitarian conditions to be defined (mixed couples, their children, expropriated owners, etc.). This kind of compensation or reparation has often been part of peace arrangements.
• Another recommendation should be adopted for the launch or the completion of roads between Algeria and its Southern neighbors. In addition to providing greater economic openness and jobs for youth, these new axes will facilitate the difficult work of police and security forces.
• Finally, the economic recovery of Ivory Coast, which is the engine of growth in the region and, particularly the Sahel Sahara, should also be made a recommendation of the National Pact.
Beyond Boko Haram and MNLA
In this vast tumult, between rebellions and assassinations, a notorious actor does not appear anymore on the radar. This “absentee” is probably the one to beneficiate most from those regional crises. Indeed, where is the drug? From the Atlantic Coast to the shores of the Red Sea via the Gulf of Benin, many observers believe that the drug trafficking is the glue linking all these factors of violence and parallel economies in the Sahel Sahara . The return of regional stability will, therefore, require much more than the settlement of issues related to MLNA or Boko Haram.
Far from the spotlight of the ongoing crises, disputes and other election campaigns, the traffickers of the region enjoy a significant omission. The silence around their activities demonstrates the capacity of their networks to influence and even control the flow of information in each country. So, the questions should be asked to their main traditional allies in the region: the national border police, their counterparts in the homeland security services as well as their political connections in higher places. As in Afghanistan, Somalia and or in other similar conflicts, the solution to the crisis in the Sahel Sahara lies with those, who under the umbrella of civil war collet most revenues. The vastness of territory with little or no administration, the poverty and vulnerability of governments and the power of informal networks are enormous challenges that require the cooperation of all neighboring States of the Sahel Sahara and the support of their external partners.
The Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihaad Fi Garbi Afriquiya or Movement Unicity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) has just signed it first terrorist attack in Tamanrasset on 3 March 2012. This attack in the city that is hosting the Operational Joint Staff Committee – Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, is an additional reason to stop the destabilization of region. Born « officially » in December 2011, the MUJWA is said to be led by a Mauritanian, Hamada O Mohamed Khayrou alias Abou Quemquem and is composed mostly of Sub-Saharan Africans. The same group detains three Spanish and Italian hostages, kidnapped in the region of Tindouf, Algeria, on October 23, 2011, for the liberation of which they are said to require 30 million Euros.
Based in Nouakchott, the Centre’s area of intervention is the band of land stretching from Mauritania down to Guinea along the Atlantic coast and, across the savannah, to Chad and Sudan. The main issues it addresses are: defense and security of the Sahel Sahara; armed violence and terrorism; competition for oil, gas and uranium; irregular migrations within and outside the region; trafficking in human, cigarettes, drugs, etc; environmental and renewable energies. The main priority is to help the region and its international partners – public and private, as well as those from Civil Society organizations, Universities, Forums, and others Groups, to collaborate further in order to ensure security and prosperity of the Sahel