The briefing took place in Nouakchott, while the chiefs of staff from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger were meeting in the Mauritanian capital. At the same time, during a meeting in Algiers, the Foreign Ministers of the Maghreb adopted a common position regarding the strengthening of security measures in response to the crisis in Mali. In the field, the MNLA seems to have been taken out of the military scene, while ECOWAS has toughen its position towards the Junta in Bamako which does not yield anything, but tacks with the formation of a Special Force for the Protection of personalities.

 

 

The Nature of the Threat in the Region

There has been a continued destabilization of the country: occupation and rooting of radicals in the Northern part of Mali with setbacks and a weakening of the MNLA. Its disappearance carries the risk of new conflicts in a time frame of 5 to 10 years. The Songhai, Arab and Fulani populations, still in the North, do not support the separatism of MNLA.

There are divisions within the political and security institutions (Green Berets against Red Berets, which were dissolved) in Bamako. The refusal, more or less said, by to see ECOWAS intervene in the internal affairs in Mali seems to attract more and more voices in Bamako.

In addition, an external military intervention that has been largely rejected by the most vocal among the Malians seems to be gaining ground inside and outside.

In areas occupied by radicals, there is a consistency in practice: to clean cities of their notables and significant other elites who may rebel or criticize; to award symbolic most known places or building for educational purposes: Timbuktu hotels assigned to education of children; to allow military training for young people removed from the schools for this purpose; to encourage the arrival of volunteers and wives so far in neighboring countries, and destruction of holy places.

The procedure of the main radical organizations also remains consistent: division of labor between them, emphasize communication through outrageous actions in order to shock and terrorize the elites, empty the cities and call on external volunteers. The latest enter by well established ways, and often by land.

Regional Initiatives

The role as well as the legitimacy of ECOWAS is not challenged by the member states or the international community. In Mali, some circles said to be close to the regime of General Moussa Traore before 1991, still fairly influential want a minimum role for ECOWAS. Traumatized and threatened, the political elite is either silent or allied to the junta or off the country.

ECOWAS should remain seized of the case and continue to adapt its method and approach to a constantly changing environment. The support of the AU and the United Nations will remain necessary.

Other neighboring countries have a role to play because of their knowledge of the Malian context, and their close historical, geographical and cultural cooperation with the Northern part of Mali. The meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Maghreb, that took place in Algiers, is very encouraging especially now. A coalition including both Algeria and Morocco remains essential to succeed in the Sahel.

However, they must act quickly, before the end of Ramadan and the political return in September in order to achieve their diplomatic influence. For them, as for ECOWAS, the next AU summit constitutes a significant step.

External partners

For the moment, these external partners, including Qatar, are bringing all humanitarian assistance and other essential items to the survival of refugees and displaced persons. This way, the international community contributes to the stabilization of the host countries and delays the effects of contagion.

Except for debates in the Security Council, the international community remained in a position of observation and gave priority to regional initiatives. But the question is for how long? Those who provided assistance and support will soon ask for a bigger role.

Especially, in September, if no significant progress has been made on the ground, one may witness a rooting of the crisis and a worsening of the realities for risks and threats.

Conclusion

The 45 days to come will be decisive for the management of the crisis in Mali. The region will be entering the period of Ramadan. For their part, the external partners will go on summer vacation. So, activists will go on missions in order to further establish their hold, especially in cities and among populations. Dislodge them will be very difficult and certainly expensive. Meanwhile, drug trade and trafficking continues in between the parties in Mali, completely immune, because of the battles

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Based in Nouakchott, the Centre’s area of intervention is the band of land stretching from Mauritania down to Guinea along the Atlantic coast and, across the savannah, to Chad and Sudan. The main issues it addresses are: defense and security of the Sahel Sahara; armed violence and terrorism; competition for oil, gas and uranium; irregular migrations within and outside the region; trafficking in human, cigarettes, drugs, etc; environmental and renewable energies. The main priority is to help the region and its international partners – public and private, as well as those from Civil Society organizations, Universities, Forums, and others Groups, to collaborate further in order to ensure security and prosperity of the Sahel